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INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Bush v. Holmes: School vouchers,
religious freedom, and state
constitutions
Richard W. Garnett* and Christopher S. Pearsall
Notre Dame Law School, USA
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,1 the Supreme Court of the US ruled that the First
Amendment’s Religion Clause, i.e. ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’, permits publicly
funded school-voucher experiments that include private and religious schools.2 In
other words, the Court made it clear*albeit by a narrow 54 margin*that
governments do not unconstitutionally ‘establish[]’ religion merely by permitting
eligible students to use publicly funded scholarships to attend qualifying religious
schools, so long as the students’ parents are able to make a ‘true private choice’ for
the school their children attend.3
However, the Zelman decision left unanswered and unresolved many questions
and problems.4 The general rule announced and applied can be stated in
straightforward fashion: A publicly funded voucher program that indirectly aids
religious institutions must be ‘neutral with respect to religion’ in that it provides
assistance ‘to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion’ who then
‘direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their genuine and
independent private choice.’5 In practice, though, uncertainties remain.
For example, although the Justices determined that, all things considered, the
particular program under review satisfied the First Amendment’s requirements, they
did not*and, indeed, could not*say anything definitive about the constitutional
fate of other, differently structured, school-choice experiments. For example, the
Ohio voucher program under review was enacted as only one part of a broader set of
reforms and initiatives*some of which involved religious schools, while others did
not*aimed at improving underperforming schools and assisting low-income
students. Should the Religion Clause apply differently to a ‘free standing’ voucher
program? The Ohio program targeted one particular, badly failing urban school
district.6 Would the ruling in Zelman extend to a broader, state-wide (or even
national) scholarship effort? And so on.
In addition to these, there are at least two more significant ways in which the
Court’s admittedly landmark decision in Zelman stopped well short of putting to rest
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the vouchers question: For starters, although the Justices’ ruling permits schoolchoice programs, it certainly does not require them; the debate over the policy merits
and justice of such programs remains in the courts of public opinion, where powerful
interest groups are sure to continue their opposition.7 In addition, the Zelman
decision considered the validity of the Cleveland choice program under the
Constitution of the US only; it did not address the fact that the States’ own
constitutions contain a variety of provisions that might constrain or prohibit choicebased reforms. Specifically, most States’ constitutions include ‘no aid’ provisions that
limit the flow of public funds, even indirectly, to religious institutions.8 Thus, even
after Zelman, a school-choice program might well survive the vagaries of the
legislative process, and overcome the self-interested objections of teachers unions
and suburban parents, and satisfy in every way the First Amendment’s requirements,
but nevertheless break up on the rocks of a State’s own, more rigorously
separationist, no-aid provision.
Legislators in Florida followed*or, more accurately, they anticipated*Zelman’s
guidelines when, in 1999, they designed and enacted that state’s Opportunity
Scholarship Program. That is, they were careful to identify eligible schools and
students without reference to religion and they offered a diverse array of
benefits*including vouchers*to a broad group of students; offer benefits to a
broad set of students; and offer those students a variety of publicly-financed options.
The Opportunity Scholarship Program was designed to provide, among other things,
tuition scholarships to students in failing schools. On the OSP model, the State
Commissioner of Education is required by law to conduct an annual assessment of
all schools in Florida and to assign a letter grade to each based on two principal
factors, first, the school’s overall performance on a statewide standardized test and,
second, the improvement of the lowest 25th percentile of students in reading, math, or
writing on the same statewide standardized test.9 If a school receives a grade of ‘F’ on
the state assessment for two school years in any four-year period, its district must
notify all parents with children in the failing school of the state’s classification and
inform them of their eligibility to choose other options.10 Under the law, a parent
could choose to enroll their child in a higher performing public school within the
district, transportation costs included.11 Or, a parent could also choose a higher
performing public school in an adjacent school district and transport the child to
their new school.12 More controversially, a parent may request an Opportunity
Scholarship for tuition at a participating private school.13 If a parent elects this
option, she receives from the state a voucher, redeemable at any eligible,
participating private school.14
Although the Florida program differs in several respects from the Ohio experiment
that was considered in Zelman, it is fairly clear that the Opportunity Scholarship
Program does not run afoul of the First Amendment to the US Constitution.
Accordingly, after their defeat in the legislature, the usual cadre of school-choice
opponents elected to attack the program in the courts of Florida, using that State’s
constitution.15
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These opponents’ challenge was recently decided by the Florida Supreme Court.
Indeed, the case*captioned Bush v. Holmes* traveled up and down the State’s
judicial system for over six years. In the trial court, the judge initially found*without
hearing any evidence*that the Opportunity Scholarship Program violated Article
IX, § 1 of the Florida Constitution. That Section provides, among other things, that
‘[a]dequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and
high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality
education and for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of
higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people
may require.’ The trial court decided that the legislature intended that Article IX,
§ 1 establish*by negative implication*a mandate that the government may only
provide a high quality education by funding public schools.16 On appeal,17 Governor
Jeb Bush and the other defendants argued that the trial court had erred in not
hearing any evidence and also that the Opportunity Scholarship Program does not, in
fact, violate the Florida Constitution. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed.
Rejecting the trial court’s finding that Article IX, § 1 prescribes the sole means for
educating the children of Florida, the Court of Appeal held: ‘[A]rticle IX, § 1 does
not unalterably hitch the requirement to make adequate provision for education to a
single, specified engine, that being the public school system.’18
On remand, the trial court ruled again for Ruth Holmes and the other plaintiffs,
but this time on different grounds, namely, that the program violated Article I, § 3 of
the Florida Constitution. That section*captioned ‘Religious freedom’*substansubstantially tracks the First Amendment’s Religion Clause, but also declares that
‘[n]o revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be
taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or
religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution. In the trial court’s
judgment, the Florida program violated this provision because, whatever the good
intentions of the program, the OSP provides tuition money to children that
ultimately flows to religious schools aid ‘aids’ them in their mission. The defendants
appealed, but were unsuccessful. The Appeals Court upheld the trial court’s
decision, first as a panel and then again en banc.19 An eight-judge majority found
that the Opportunity Scholarship Program violated Article I, § 3, reading the third
sentence quoted above to prohibit any indirect benefits to religious schools that
might accrue when children direct their tuition vouchers to those schools. Five of
those eight judges would also found that the program violates Article IX, § 1.20 Five
other judges dissented, insisting that, properly understood, Article I permits the
legislature to employ religion-neutral vouchers as a means of improving education in
the state.21 The dissent concludes, ‘[b]ecause the Florida no-aid provision is no more
restrictive than the US provision, the Florida program should be ruled constitutional
as was the program in Zelman.’22
The Florida Supreme Court agreed to review the case, and heard oral arguments
on 7 June 2005. Ultimately the Article IX, § 1 issue controlled when the Court
decided the case on January 23, 2006. Writing for a 52 majority, Florida Chief
Justice Pariente concluded that, ‘[t]he OSP contravenes [Article IX, § 1] because it
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allows some children to receive a publicly funded education through an alternative
system of private schools that are not subject to the uniformity requirements of the
public school system.’23 These ‘uniformity requirements’ refer to standardized state
curricula, teacher certification requirements, and direct oversight by the state.
Although most private and parochial schools in Florida have and follow their own
objective accreditation, curriculum, and teacher certification standards,24 the fact
that these standards differ from Florida’s uniform state standards ultimately doomed
the OSP in the eyes of the Florida Supreme Court.25 The dissent, authored by
Justice Bell, sharply criticized the majority’s methods of statutory construction and
lack of deference to the legislature’s authority. Regardless, the Florida Supreme
Court addressed only a ‘narrow question’26 when it ultimately disposed of Bush v.
Holmes, and consequently the interpretation of much of the relevant provisions in
Florida’s Constitution still remains contested.
At the heart of this case*and, in all likelihood, at the heart of the Florida Supreme
Court’s decision*are two provisions of the Florida Constitution: Article IX, § 1 and
Article I, § 3. Article IX, again, reflects the importance of education to its drafters
and to the State. It declares that ‘[t]he education of children is a fundamental value
of the people of the State of Florida,’ and then makes it a ‘paramount duty of the
state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its
borders.’ The interpretive controversy in Bush v. Holmes centers on the above-quoted
text that follows: ‘Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient,
safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to
obtain a high quality education and for the establishment, maintenance, and
operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs
that the needs of the people may require.’
According to the plaintiffs in Holmes, this language is not only aspirational, and it
does more than prescribe the ends or goals of education-related legislation. That is,
they understand Article IX not only as a mandate for a ‘system of free public
schools,’ but also as implicitly prohibiting education-related disbursals to private
schools, or students attending them. In their view, the Article specifies the only
constitutionally permissible way the state may make ‘adequate provision’ for
education. The first part of Article IX, § 1 expresses the general duty of the state
to ‘make adequate provision’ for every child’s education; the second part prescribes
specifically how adequate provision ‘shall be made.’ In other words, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius: by specifying one thing the state must do to fulfill its mandate (i.e.
establish free public schools), the Constitution says also that it may not do anything
else (i.e. enact and fund the Opportunity Scholarship Program).27
The government’s interpretation, on the other hand, is decidedly less restrictive
*and more straightforward. It concedes that Article IX, § 1 imposes a duty on
the state to provide for public education, but maintains that legislature retains
wide discretion when fulfilling its mandate, as it does with most matters.28 Rather
than making less than ‘adequate provision’ for education, the Legislature by
enacting and funding the OSP is going beyond what the Constitution requires for
the children of Florida. After all, the state already has a system of free public schools.
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The Opportunity Scholarship Program was enacted as an innovative attempt to
improve under-performing public schools by increasing competition and raising
expectations. At the same time, the OSP provides individual students trapped in
failing schools an opportunity for a better education. The Legislature’s reasons for
enacting the program are well in accord with the overarching theme of Article IX, § 1,
which is to provide for the education of all children in the state. Doing more than
what is simply ‘adequate,’ by enacting additional programs beyond what is
constitutionally required, cannot be less than ‘adequate’ and therefore cannot violate
Article IX, § 1.
The plaintiffs, for their part, countered by acknowledging that the Legislature has
plenary power to create programs not provided for in the state Constitution, but
insisting that this power does not extend to actions taken in lieu of actions specifically
mandated by the Constitution. It is hard to see, however, how the creation of
the OSP is an action taken ‘in lieu of’ establishing and maintaining a public
school system. Still, the plaintiffs’ view is that an interpretation of Article IX, § 1
permitting the OSP would mean that, under the state Constitution, Florida must do
no more than provide children with the option of attending a public school, and
that the state could theoretically transfer its education funding to private schools
through a future program. But even putting aside the fact that the OSP’s benefits are
limited to students in failing public schools, and that the program is designed
to improve the public school system, public schools in the US have long been an
option provided by the states for parents to choose, or not.29 Parents already retain
the liberty to choose their children’s schools by electing to send their children to
private or parochial school, or even by choosing to move within the boundaries of a
favored public school district. Of course, exercising any of those options requires the
financial power to do so. In some ways, then, the OSP can be construed as an
extension of that power to less economically privileged families stuck in failing public
school districts.
As was noted earlier, the Florida Supreme Court initially declined, during the first
appeal, to consider the Article IX, § 1 issue. Still, resolving the case on Article IX, § 1
grounds may have been attractive to some Justices because doing so insulates the case
from review and possible reversal by the Supreme Court of the US. This is because
the Florida Supreme Court has the final word on the meaning of its own
Constitution. Thus, a ruling by that Court that, under Article IX, the Legislature
may not provide private-school vouchers to children in failing schools would not set
up any federal questions for the Supreme Court of the US to resolve.
In any event, the heart of matter in the lower courts on this appeal, and of the
question certified for review by the Florida Supreme Court, was not the state
constitution’s public-education provision, but instead its religious-freedom text,
Article I, § 3. That section, as has already been noted, reads: ‘There shall be no law
respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise
thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public morals,
peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall
ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or
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religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution’ (emphasis added). The first
sentence of this section is, of course, a near-restatement of the First Amendment’s
Religion Clause. And, again, it is not seriously contended that the OSP contravenes
the First Amendment, as understood by the contemporary Supreme Court.30 The
question raised by Bush v. Holmes in the lower courts, then, is whether the rest of the
language in Article I, § 3 forbids the state from enacting a program like the OSP.
Certainly the second sentence imposes no such limit; it was inserted in 1885 as part
of the Reconstruction of the south following the Civil War to limit the exercise of
religion.31 It is the third sentence*the ‘no aid’ provision*that was the basis for the
Florida District Court of Appeal’s ruling that the OSP is unconstitutional.
The Florida District Court of Appeal endorsed the plaintiffs’ interpretation of
Article I, § 3, which would allow the state far less leeway than does the First
Amendment in creating programs and partnerships with religious institutions to
provide general public benefits. On this reading, the third sentence of Article I, § 3
was deliberately included in the ratified Constitution of 1968 and therefore,
‘necessarily imposes restrictions beyond the Establishment Clause.’32 These restrictions are so tight, according to the Appeals Court, that any ‘indirect or secondary
benefit to sectarian institutions from the use of state funds would be sufficient
to violate the provision,’ regardless of the degree to which other non-sectarian
institutions or the general public directly benefits.33 In other words, despite the
fact that the direct beneficiaries of the OSP are the children and their parents
who may endorse a government-sponsored voucher to whatever participating
private school they choose, the OSP is unconstitutional under Article I, § 3
because endorsing a voucher to a religious school confers an indirect benefit to the
school.34
The trouble with the Appeals Court’s interpretation, the government counters, is
that a number of past Florida Supreme Court cases suggest that Article I, § 3 should
not be interpreted so narrowly. Tax exemptions for homes for the aged owned by
religious organizations,35 revenue bonds issued by the state for the aid of both
religious and non-religious schools,36 perpetual easements in a large land grant to the
government for a church to use a local lake for baptisms,37 and making public school
buildings available to churches on Sundays for religious services38 have all been held
constitutional by the Florida Supreme Court because of the secular purpose that the
programs further and the general applicability of the program. In light of these cases,
the phrase, ‘in aid of,’ should not be understood to mean ‘results in any benefit to, no
matter how small,’ but rather, ‘for the purpose of aiding.’ For example, a tax
exemption offered to all homes for the aged, both religious and non-religious, is
enacted in aid of the elderly population of Florida. Even though offering a tax break
to both religious and non-religious homes for the aged may result in the religious
homes receiving some incidental benefit, these indirect contributions are not ‘in aid
of’ the religious institution or its mission. The government is not trying to aid
religion, but rather the aged population within the state. Put differently, ‘when public
financial benefits enjoyed by religious institutions are merely incidental to the
achievement of a non-sectarian public purpose, there is no violation of article I,
/
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section 3.’39 It was on this understanding that the Florida Legislature enacted the
OSP for the purpose of aiding under-privileged students and spurring certain public
school districts to improvement.40
In addition to case law, the parties in Bush v. Holmes looked to the history and
context of Article I, § 3. In 1875, Speaker of the House James G. Blaine proposed an
amendment to the US Constitution that would have prohibited any state tax
revenues for education from aiding ‘any religious sect.’41 Blaine’s proposal failed in
the Senate by four votes, supporters of the amendment were able to convince some
states to enact similar provisions in their state constitutions, and also were able to
make adoption of similar provisions a requirement for new states entering the Union
after 1875.42 These amendments generally became known as ‘Blaine Amendments.’
Now, at that time, the public, or ‘common,’ schools were regarded by their
supporters*and, more particularly, by Protestant Christians*as ‘non-sectarian’
institutions. In the mid- and late-19th century, ‘non-sectarian’ in the education
context did not mean ‘secular,’ but generally Protestant. As Catholic immigrants
began resisting a curriculum meant to indoctrinate students with Protestant values,
however, anti-Catholic forces emerged to counter them. Chief among the antiCatholic forces’ aims was to preserve tax revenues for common schools exclusively,
hence legislative enactments in the spirit of James G. Blaine, like Florida’s Article I, §
3, enacted for the first time in the Florida Constitution of 1885.43
This history is relevant to the dispute in Bush v. Holmes because it strengthens the
claim that the third sentence of Article I, § 3 was meant to bar programs like the OSP.
Even if rooted in anti-Catholicism, the plaintiffs argue in so many words, the intent
was clearly to prevent tax revenues from being used to fund sectarian education in
Catholic schools. And, the government admitted at oral argument, the nasty history
coloring Article I, § 3 is not sufficient grounds either to save the OSP, or invalidate
section 3.44
That said, if the Florida Supreme Court had invalidated the OSP on Article I,
§ 3 grounds, they probably would have created an issue that could be reviewed by the
Supreme Court of the US. As the government has contended throughout the Holmes
litigation, Blaine amendments may conflict with rights guaranteed under the US
Constitution, specifically the Free Exercise Clause contained in the First Amendment.45 And, of course, the Supreme Court of the US has the power to strike Article
I, § 3 from the Florida State Constitution entirely if it conflicts with he First
Amendment of the US Constitution. In fact, the Supreme Court of the US recently
considered an argument that a generally applicable scholarship program in
Washington state violates the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment because
it prohibits recipients from pursuing a theology degree in Locke v. Davey. 46 The
Washington program was found not to violate the Free Exercise clause. While this
case would certainly have been cited in a further appeal of Bush v. Holmes, the
Supreme Court’s narrow holding in Locke is far from dispositive. Thus, those
backing a reformed OSP and similar programs in the future could possibly lose the
battle in Florida but win the war in Washington, DC if a case like Bush v. Holmes is
eventually decided on Article I, § 3 grounds.
/
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Though the constitutionality of school choice programs is, as a general matter
anyway, settled under the federal Constitution, the constitutionality of individual
programs at the state level is still at issue around the country. Bush v. Holmes is the
latest legal fight in the broader movement within America to increase educational
opportunity for the underprivileged through school voucher programs. In enacting
the OSP in 1999, Florida was the first state to institute a school choice program
statewide, and others have followed suit.47 It also ended up being the first statewide
school choice program invalidated by its state Supreme Court. Nevertheless school
choice supporters and opponents alike are sure to draw lessons from the litigation in
Bush v. Holmes when making their next moves.
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It is likely, though, that an earlier Supreme Court would have invalidated the Program. In
Committee Pub. Ed. V. Nyquist , the Supreme Court struck down a New York program that
provided tuition reimbursements to families with children in religious schools on the
grounds that the reimbursements had the effect of advancing religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause. 413 US 756 (1973). The analysis under Zelman is more favorable to
such programs as discussed above.
Bush v. Holmes , 886 So.2d 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Talbot ‘Sandy’
D’Alemberte, Commentary, art. I, § 3, 25A Fla. Stat. Annot. 79 (1991)).
Id. at 351.
Id. at 352.
This interpretation is consistent with the interpretation that some state courts have put on
their ‘Blaine Amendments.’ Others, though, have read their similarly worded no-aid
provisions as imposing no greater restrictions than the Establishment Clause.
Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes , 239 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1970).
Nohrr v. Brevard County Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971).
Koerner v. Borck , 100 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1958).
Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1959).
Bush Br. at 17.
As the government emphasizes, the OSP is not the only program that the government feels is
threatened by the Court of Appeal’s reasoning. Appendix F to the Governor’s initial brief
includes a list of 37 programs designed to improve the public welfare in education, health,
corrections, and other areas that result in some incidental benefit to religious organizations.
There are already 19 such programs designed to improve education in Florida. Should
Article I, § 3 be read so narrowly as to invalidate any program that results in even a small
benefit to religion, these programs are at risk. The government asserts such a ruling therefore
leads to ‘absurd results’ where ‘no religious organization could ever rent . . . or occupy any
public property.’ Bush Br. at 15 (citing Southside Estates, 115 So. 2d at 700) (the court in
Southside Estates rejected an argument that, ‘regardless of how small . . . if anything of value
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can be traced from the public agency to the religious group, the Constitution has been
thereby violated.’ Id. at 699).
The relevant text of Rep. Blaine’s amendment read: ‘[N]o money raised by taxation in any
State for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any
public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor shall
any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.’ H.R.J. Res. 1, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875). Also available online
at: www.blaineamendments.org/Intro/BAtext-US.html.
For a fuller overview of the political history involved with this constitutional amendment, see
Mark Edward DeForrest (2003), An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments:
Origin, Scope and First Amendment Concerns, Harv. J. L. Pub. Pol . 26, 551, 556577.
Scholars still dispute the extent to which anti-Catholic sentiment drove the movement to
pass Blaine amendments in the states. See Laura S. Underkuffler (2003) The ‘Blaine’ Debate:
Must States Fund Religious Schools? First Amend. L. Rev. , 2 179, 195 (arguing that Blaine
amendments were the products of more than a singular anti-Catholic motivation). See also
Steven K. Green, ‘Blaming Blaine’: Understanding the Blaine Amendment and the ‘NoFunding’ Principle, First Amend. L. Rev. 2, 107. Yet, though anti-Catholic sentiment may
not have been the single driving motivation for the passage of Blaine amendments, it played a
critical role in the establishment of forces like the infamous Know-Nothing party, who
vigorously supported Blaine amendments around the nation. See DeForrest, supra note 43,
at 558566. See also Phillip Hamburger (2002) Separation of Church and State (Harvard
University Press); John McGreevey (2003) Catholicism and American Freedom: A History
(W.W. Norton).
When asked whether he was, ‘espousing because Article I, § 3 may have come at a time when
there was bigotry, that we should weed it out of the Constitution?’ counsel for the
intervenors on the government’s side answered, ‘Not at all . . . [t]he provision must
be . . . given its full force.’ He then went on to argue again that the provision only bars
deliberate government action undertaken to aid religion, not government action designed to
assist children in failing public schools. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 13. Of course antiCatholicism could serve as a basis for striking down Section Three, under the First
Amendment, if it manifested itself in such a way as to infringe on rights protected under the
Free Exercise Clause.
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.’ (emphasis added). US Const. amend. I. For an analysis of the salience of
possible Free Exercise challenges to the Florida Blaine amendment, see Lupu and Tuttle,
supra note 7, at 957-973.
540 US 712 (2004).
On 30 June 2005, Ohio Governor Bob Taft signed a state budget bill that expands the
Cleveland voucher program at issue in Zelman to the rest of the state. See Jim Provance, Taft
Signs Budget That Overhauls Ohio Taxes: Governor Vetoes Ban on Stem Cell Aid, Toledo
Blade, 1 July 2005, available online at: www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID //
20050701/NEWS24/507010557.

